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PROPERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY*
Moiuus R. COHENt
Property and sovereignty, as every student knows, belong to
entirely different branches of the law. Sovereignty is a concept of
political or public law and property belongs to civil or private law.
This distinction between public and private law is a fixed feature
of our law-school curriculum. It was expressed with characteristic
i8th century neatness and clarity by Montesquieu, when he said
that by political laws we acquire liberty and by civil law property,
and that we must not apply the principles of one to the other.,
Montesquieu's view that political laws must in no way retrench on
private property because no public good is greater than the maintenance of private property, was echoed by Blackstone and became
the basis of legal thought in America. Though Austin, with his usual
prolix and near-sighted sincerity, managed to throw some serious
doubts on this classical distinction,2 it has continued to be regarded
as one of the fixed divisions of the jural field. In the second volume
of his Genossenschaftsreclhtthe learned Gierke treated us to some very
interesting speculations as to how the Teutons became the founders
of public law just as the Romans were the founders of private law.
But in later years he somewhat softened this sharp distinction;3 and
common law lawyers are inclined rather to regard the Roman system
as giving more weight to public than to private law.
The distinction between property and sovereignty is generally
identified with the Roman discrimination between dominium, the
rule over things by the individual, and imperium, the rule over all
*A lecture delivered. at the Cornell Law School, under the Frank Irvine
Lectureship of the Phi Delta Phi Foundation, April thirtieth, nineteen
hundred and twenty-seven.
tProfessor of Philosophy, College of the City of New York.
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individuals by the prince. Like other Roman distinctions, this has
been regarded as absolutely fixed in the nature of things. But early
Teutonic Law, the law of the Anglo-Saxons, Franks, Visigoths,
Lombards and other tribes, makes no such distinction; and the state
long continued to be the prince's estate so that even in the 18th
century the Prince of Hesse could sell his subjects as soldiers to the
King of England. The essence of feudal law-a system not confined
to medieval Europe-is the inseparable. connection between land
tenure and personal homage involving often rather menial services
on the part of the tenant and always genuine sovereignty by the
landlord.
The feudal baron had, for instance, the right to determine the
marriage of the ward, as well as the right to nominate the priest;
and the great importance of the former as a real property right is
amply attested in Magna Carta and in the Statute Quia Emptores.
Likewise was the administration of justice in the baron's court an
incident of land ownership; and if, unlike the French up to the Revolution, the English did not regard the office of judge as a revenueproducing incident of seigniorage to be sold in the open market (as
Army Commissions were up to the time of Gladstone) the local
squire did in fact continue to act as Justice of the Peace. Ownership
of the land and local political sovereignty were inseparable.
Can we dismiss all this with the simple exclamation that all this
is medieval and we have long outgrown it?
Well, right before our eyes the Law of Property Act of 1925 is
sweeping away substantial remains of the complicated feudal Land
Laws of England, by abolishing the difference between the descent of
real and that of personal property, and by abolishing all legal (though
not equitable) estates intermediate between leaseholds and fees
simple absolute. These remains of feudalism have not been mere
vestiges. They have played an important part in the national life
of England. Their absurdities and indefensible abuses were pilloried
with characteristic wit and learning by the peerless Maitland. The
same thing had been done most judiciously by Joshua Williams,
the teacher of several generations of English lawyers brought up on
the seventeen editions of his great text book on Real Property Law.
Yet these and similar efforts made no impression on the actual law.
What these great men did not see with sufficient clearness, was that
back of the complicated law of settlement, fee-tails, copyhold estates,
of the heir-at-law, of the postponement of women, and other feudal
incidents, there was a great and well founded fear that by simplifying
and modernizing the real property law of England the land might
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become more marketable. Once land becomes fully marketable it
can no longer be counted on to remain in the hands of the landed
aristocratic families; and this means the passing of their political
power and the end of their control over the destinies of the British
Empire. For if American experience has demonstrated anything,
it is that the continued leadership by great families cannot be as
well founded on a money as on a land economy. The same kind of
talent which enables Jay Gould to acquire dominion over certain
railroads enables Mr. Harriman to take it away from his sons.
From the point of view of an established land economy, a money
economy thus seems a state of perpetual war instead of a social order
where son succeeds father. The motto that a career should be open
to talent thus seems a justification of anarchy, just as the election of
rulers (kings or priests) seems an anarchic procedure to those used
to the regular succession of father by son.
That which was hidden from Maitland, Joshua Williams, and the
other great ones, was revealed to a Welsh solicitor who in the budget
of 19IO proposed to tax the land so as to force it on the market.
The radically revolutionary character of this proposal was at once
recognized in England. It was bitterly fought by all those who
treasured what had remained of the old English aristocratic rule.
When this budget finally passed, the basis of the old real property
law and the effective power of the House of Lords was gone. The
Legislation of 1925-6 was thus a final completion in the realm of
private law of the revolution which was fought in i9io in the forum
of public law, i. e., in the field of taxation and the power of the House
of Lords.
As the terms "medievalism" and "feudalism" have become with
us terms of approbrium, we are apt to think that only unenlightened
selfishness has up to recently prevented English land law from
cutting its medieval moorings and embarking on the sea of purely
money or commercial economy. This light-hearted judgment,
however, may be somewhat sobered by reflection on a second recent
event-the Supreme Court decision on the Minimum Wage Law.
Without passing judgment at this point on the soundness of the
reasoning, whereby the majority reached its decision, the result
may still fairly be characterised as a high water mark of law in a
purely money or commercial economy. For by that decision private
monetary interests receive precedence over the sovereign duty of
the state to maintain decent standards of living.
The state, which has an undisputed right to prohibit contracts
against public morals or public policy, is here declared to have no
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right to prohibit contracts under which many receive wages less
than the minimum of subsistence, so that if they are not the objects
of humiliating public or private charity, theybecome centres of the
physical and moral evils that result from systematic underfeeding
and degraded standards of life. Let me repeat I do not wish here
to argue the merits or demerits of the minimum wage decision.
Much less am I concerned with any quixotic attempt to urge England
to go back to medievalism. But the two events together show in
strong relief how recent and in the main exceptional is the extreme
position of the Zaissez faire doctrine, which according to the insinuation of Justice Holmes, has led the Supreme Court to read Herbert
Spencer's extreme individualism into the i 4th amendment, and
according to others, has enacted Cain's motto, "Am I my brother's
keeper" as the supreme law of industry. Dean Pound has shown
that in making a property right out of the freedom to contract, the
Supreme Court has stretched the meaning of the term property to
include what it has never before signified in the law or jurisprudence
of any civilized country. But whether this extentsion is justified
or not, it certainly means the passing of a certain domain of sovereignty from the state to the private employer of labor, who now has the
absolute right to discharge and threaten to discharge any employee
who wants to join a trade union, and the absolute right to pay a wage
which is injurious to a basic social interest.
It may be that economic forces will themselves correct the abuse
which the Supreme Court does not allow the state to remove directly,
that economic forces will eliminate parasitic industries which do not
pay the miniumum of subsistence, because such industries are not as
economically efficient and profitable as those that pay higher wages.
It was similarly argued that slavery was bound to disappear on
account of its economic inefficiency. Meanwhile, however, the
sovereignty of the state is limited by the manner in which the courts
interpret the term "property" in the 5th and i 4th amendment to the
Federal Constitution and in the bills of rights in our state constitutions. This makes it imperative for us to consider the natureof
private property with reference to the sovereign power of the state
to look after the general welfare. A dispassionate scientific study of
this requires an examination of the nature of property, its justification, and the ultimate meaning of the policies based on it.
I
PROPERTY AS POWER

Anyone who frees himself from the crudest materialism readily
recognizes that as a legal term property denotes not material things
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but certain rights. In the world of nature apart from more or less
organized society, there are things but clearly no property rights.
Further reflection shows that a property right is not to be identified
with the fact of physical possession. Whatever technical definition
of property we may prefer, we must recognize that a property right
is a relation not between an owner and a thing, but between the
owner and other individuals in reference to things. A right is always
against one or more individuals. This becomes unmistakably clear
if we take specifically modem forms of property such as franchises,
patents, good will, etc., which constitute such a large part of the
capitalized assets of our industrial and commercial enterprises.
The classical view of property as a right over things resolves it
into component rights such as the jus utendi, jus disponendi, etc,
But the essence of private property is always the right to exclude
others. The law does not guarantee me the physical or social ability
of actually using what it calls mine. By public regulations it may
indirectly aid me by removing certain general hindrances to the
enjoyment of property. But the law of property helps me directly
only to exclude others from using the things which it assigns to me.
If then somebody else wants to use the food, the house, the land, or
the plow which the law calls mine, he has to get my consent. To the
extent that these things are necessary to the life of my neighbor,
the law thus confers on me a power, limited but real, to make him do
what I want. If Laban has the sole disposal of his daughters and his
cattle, Jacob must serve him if he desires to possess them. In a regime
where land is the principal source of obtaining a livelihood, he who
has the legal right over the land receives homage and service from
those who wish to live on it.
The character of property as sovereign power compelling service
and obedience may be obscured for us in a commercial economy by
the fiction of the so-called labor contract as a free bargain and by
the frequency with which service is rendered indirectly through a
money payment. But not only is there actually little freedom to
bargain on the part of the steel worker or miner who needs a job,
but in some cases the medieval subject had as much power to bargain
when he accepted the sovereignty of his lord. Today I do not
directly serve my landlord if I wish to live in the city with a roof
over my head, but I must work for others to pay him rent with which
he obtains the personal services of others. The money needed for
purchasing things must for the vast majority be acquired by hard
labor and disagreeable service to those to whom the law has accorded
dominion over the things necessary for subsistence.
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To a philosopher this is of course not at all an argument against
private property. It may well be that compulsion in the economic
as well as the political realm is necessary for civilized life. But we
must not overlook the actual fact that dominion over things is also
imperium over our fellow human beings.
The extent of the power over the life of others which the legal
order confers on those called owners is not fully appreciated by those
who think of the law as merely protecting men in their possession.
Property law does more. It determines what men shall acquire.
Thus, protecting the property rights of a landlord means giving him
the right to collect rent, protecting the property of a railroad or a
public service corporation means giving it the right to make certain
charges. Hence the ownership of land and machinery, with the
rights of drawing rent, interest, etc. determines the future distribution
of the goods that will come into being-determines what share of
such goods various individuals shall acquire. The average life of
goods that are either consumable or used for production of other
goods is very short. Hence a law that merely protected men in their
possession and did not also regulate the acquisition of new goods
would be of little use.
From this point of view it can readily be seen that when a court
rules that a gas company is entitled to a return of 6% on its investment, it is not merely protecting property already possessed, it is
also determining that a portion of the future social produce shall
under certain conditions go to that company. Thus not only medieval
landlords but the owners of all revenue-producing property are
in fact granted by the law certain powers to tax the future social
product. When to this power of taxation there is added the power to
command the services of large numbers who are not economically
independent, we have the essence of what historically has constituted
political sovereignty.
Though the sovereign power possessed by the modem large property
owners assumes a somewhat different form from that formerly
possessed by the lord of the land, they are not less real and no less
extensive. Thus the ancient lord had a limited power to control
the modes of expenditure of his subjects by direct sumptuary legislation. The modem captain of industry and of finance has no such
direct power himself, though his direct or indirect influence with
the legislature may in that respect be considerable. But those who
have the power to standardize and advertise certain products do
determine what we may buy and use. We cannot well wear clothes
except within lines decreed by their manufacturers, and our food is
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becoming more and more restricted to the kinds that are branded
and standardized.
This power of the modem owner of capital to make us feel the
necessity of buying more and more of his material goods (that may
be more profitable to produce than economical to use) is a phenomenon
of the utmost significance to the moral philosopher. The moral
philosopher must also note that the modem captain of industry or
finance exercises greater influence in setting the fashion of expenditure
by his personal example. Between a landed aristocracy and their
tenants, the difference is sharp and fixed, so that imitation of the
former's mode of life by the latter is regarded as absurd and even
immoral. In a money or commercial economy differences of income
and mode of life are more gradual and readily hidden so that there is
great pressure to engage in lavish expenditure in order to appear in
a higher class than one's income really allows. Such expenditure
may even advance one's business credit. This puts pressure not
merely on ever greater expenditure but more specifically on expenditure for ostentation rather than for comfort. Though a landed
aristocracy may be wasteful in keeping large tracts of land for hunting
purposes, the need for discipline to keep in power compels the cultivation of a certain hardihood which the modem wealthy man can
ignore. An aristocracy assured of its recognized superiority need
not engage in the race of lavish expenditure regardless of enjoyment.
In addition to these indirect ways in which the wealthy few determine the mode of life of the many, there is the somewhat more
direct mode which bankers and financiers exercise when they determine the flow of investment, e. g., when they influence building
operations by the amount that they will lend on mortgages. This
power becomes explicit and obvious when a needy country has to
borrow foreign capital to develop its resources.
I have already mentioned that the recognition of private property
as a form of sovereignty is not itself an argument against it. Some
form of government we must always have. For the most part men
prefer to obey and let others take the trouble to think out rules,
regulations and orders. That is why we are always setting up
authorities; and when we cannot find any we write to the newspaper
as the final arbiter. While, however, government is a necessity, not
all forms of it are of equal value. At any rate it is necessary to
apply to the law of property all those considerations of social ethics
and enlightened public policy which ought to be brought to the
discussion of any just form of government.
To do this, let us begin with a consideration of the usual justifications of private property.
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II
THE JUSTIFICATION OF PROPERTY

I. The Occupation Theory
The oldest aid up to recently the most influential defense of
private property was based on the assumed right of the original
discoverer and occupant to dispose of that which thus became his.
This view dominated the thought of Roman jurists and of modem
philosophers-from Grotius to Kant-so much so that the right
of the laborer to the produce of his work was sometimes defended
on the ground that the laborer "occupied" the material which he
fashioned into the finished product.
It is rather easy to find fatal flaws in this view. Few accumulations
of great wealth were ever simply found. Rather were they acquired
by the labor of many, by conquest, by business manipulation, and by
other means. It is obvious that today at any rate few economic goods
can be acquired by discovery and first occupancy. 4 Even in the few
cases when they are, as in fishing and trapping, we are apt rather to

think of the labor involved as the proper basis of the property
acquired. Indeed, there seems nothing ethically self-evident in the
motto that "findings is keepings." There seems nothing wrong in
a law that a treasure trove shall belong to the king or the state
rather than to the finder. Shall the finder of a river be entitled to
all the water in it?
Moreover, even if we were to grant that the original finder or
occupier should have possession as against anyone else, it by no
means follows that he may use it arbitrarily or that his rule shall
prevail indefinitely after his death. The right of others to acquire
the property from him by bargain, by inheritance, or by testamentary
disposition, is not determined by the principle of occupation.
Despite all these objections, however, there is a kernel of positive
value in this principle. Protecting the discoverer or first occupant,
is really part of the more general principle that possession as such
should be protected. There is real human economy in doing so until
somebody shows a better claim than the possessor.

It makes for

certainty and security of transaction as well as for public peaceprovided the law is ready to set aside possession acquired in ways

that are inimical to public order. Various principles of justice may
determine the distribution of goods and the retribution to be made
for acts of injustice. But the law must not ignore the principle of
4

1n granting patents, copyrights, etc., the principle of reward for useful work
or to encourage productivity seems so much more relevant that the principle of

discovery and first occupancy seems to have little force.
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inertia in human affairs. Continued possession creates expectations
in the possessor and in others and only a very poor morality would
ignore the hardship of frustrating these expectations and rendering
human relations insecure, even to correct some old flaws in the
original acquisition. Suppose some remote ancestor of yours did
acquire your property by fraud, robbery or conquest, e. g. in the days
of William of Normandy. Would it be just to take it away from
you and your dependents who have held it in good faith? Reflection
on the general insecurity that would result from such procedure leads
us to see that as habit is the basis of individual life, continued practice
must be the basis of social procedure. Any form of property which
exists has therefore a claim to continue until it can be shown that the
effort to change it is worth while. Continual changes in property laws
would certainly discourage enterprise.
Nevertheless, it would be as absurd to argue that the distribution
of property must never be modified by law as it would be to argue
that the distribution of political power must never be changed. No
less a philosopher than Aristotle argued against changing even bad
laws, lest the habit of obedience be thereby impaired. There is
something to be said for this, but only so long as we are in the realm
of merely mechanical obedience. When we introduce the notion of
free or rational obedience, Aristotle's argument loses its force in the
political realm; and similar considerations apply to any property
system that can claim the respect of rational beings.
2.

The Labor Theory.

That everyone is entitled to the full produce of his labor is assumed
as self-evident by both socialists and conservatives who believe that
capital is the result of the savings of labor. However, as economic
goods are never the result of any one man's unaided labor, our
maxim is altogether inapplicable. How shall we determine what
part of the value of a table should belong to the carpenter, to the
lumberman, to the transport worker, to the policeman who guarded
the peace while the work was being done, and to the indefinitely large
numbers of others whose cooperation was necessary? Moreover,
even if we could tell what any one individual has produced-let us
imagine a Robinson Crusoe growing up all alone on an island and
in no way indebted to any community-it would still be highly
questionable whether he has a right to keep the full produce of his
labor when some shipwrecked mariner needs his surplus food to
keep from starving.
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In actual society no one ever thinks it unjust that a wealthy old
bachelor should have part of his presumably just earnings taken
away in the form of a tax for the benefit of other people's children,
or that one immune to certain diseases, should be taxed to support
hospitals, etc. We do not think there is any injustice involved in
such cases because social interdependence is so intimate that no
man can justly say: "This wealth is entirely and absolutely mine as
the result of my own unaided effort."
The degree of social solidarity varies, of course; and it is easy to
conceive of a sparsely settled community, such as Missouri at the
beginning of the 19th century, where a family of hunters or isolated
cultivators of the soil might regard everything which it acquired as
the product of its own labor. Generally, however, human beings
start with a stock of tools or information acquired from others and
they are more or less dependent upon some government for protection
against foreign aggression, etc.
Yet despite these and other criticisms, the labor theory contains
too much substantial truth to be brushed aside. The essential truth
is that labor has to be encouraged and that property must be distributed in such a way as to encourage ever greater efforts at productivity.
As not all things produced are ultimately good, as even good
things may be produced at an unjustified expense in human life
and worth, it is obvious that other principles besides that of labor
or productivity are needed for an adequate basis or justification of
any system of property law. We can only say dialectically that all
other things being equal, property should be distributed with due
regard to the productive needs of the community. We must, however,
recognize that a good deal of property accrues to those who are not
productive,5 and a good deal of productivity does not and perhaps
should not receive its reward in property. Nor should we leave this
theme without recalling the Hebrew-Christian view-and for that
matter, the specifically religious view-that the first claim on property
is by the man who needs it rather than the man who has created it.
Indeed, the only way of justifying the principle of distribution of
property according to labor is to show that it serves the larger social
need.
The occupation theory has shown us the necessity for security
of possession and the labor theory the need for encouraging enterprise.
These two needs are mutually dependent. Anything which dis5
Bonomists often claim that the unearned increment is the greatest source of
wealth. See Bull. of Am. Econ. Ass'n (4th ser., No. 2) 542 ff.
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courages enterprise makes our possessions less valuable, and it is
obvious that it is not worth while engaging in economic enterprise
if there is no prospect of securely possessing the fruit of it. Yet
there is also a conflict between these two needs. The owners of land,
wishing to secure the continued possession by the family, oppose
laws which make it subject to free financial transactions or make it
possible that land should be taken away from one's heirs by a judgment creditor for personal debts. In an agricultural economy security
of possession demands that the owner of a horse should be able to
reclaim it no matter into whose hands it has fallen. But in order
that markets should be possible, it becomes necessary that the
innocent purchaser should have a good title. This conflict between
static and dynamic security has been treated most suggestively by
Demogue and I need only refer you to his masterly book, "Les
Notions fondementales du Droitpriv."
3. Property and Personality
Hegel, Ahrens, Lorimer, and other idealists have tried to deduce
the right of property from the individual's right to act as a free
personality. To be free one must have a sphere of self-assertion in
the external world. One's private property provides such an opportunity.
Waiving all traditional difficulties in applying the metaphysical
idea of freedom to empirical legal acts, we may still object that the
notion of personality is too vague to enable us to deduce definite
legal consequences by means of it. How, for example, can the
principle of personality help us to decide to what extent there shall
be private rather than public property in railroads, mines, gas-works,
and other public necessities?
Not the extremest communist would deny that in the interest of
privacy certain personal belongings such as are typified by the toothbrush, must be under the dominion of the individual owner, to the
absolute exclusion of everyone else. This, however, will not carry
us far if we recall that the major effect of property in land, in the
machinery of production, in capital goods, etc., is to enable the
owner to exclude others from their necessities, and thus to compel
them to serve him. Ahrens, one of the chief expounders of the
personality theory, argues "It is undoubtedly contrary to the right
of personality to have persons dependent on others on account of
material goods."18 But if this is so, the primary effect of property
on a large scale is to limit freedom, since the one thing that private
611 COURS DE DROIT NATUREL (6th ed.) io8.
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property law does not do is to guarantee a minimum of subsistence
or the necessary tools of freedom to everyone. So far as a regime
of private property fails to do the latter it rather compels people to
part with their freedom.
It may well be argued in reply that just as restraining traffic rules
in the end give us greater freedom of motion, so, by giving control
over things to individual property owners, greater economic freedom
is in the end assured to all. This is a strong argument, as can be
seen by comparing the different degrees of economic freedom that
prevail in lawless and in law abiding communities. It is, however, an
argument for legal order rather than any particular form of government or private property. It argues for a regime where every one
has a definite sphere of rights and duties, but it does not tell us
where these lines should be drawn. The principle of freedom of
personality certainly cannot justify a legal order wherein a few can,
by virtue of their legal monopoly over necessities, compel others to
work under degrading and brutalizing conditions. A government
which limits the right of large land-holders limits the rights of property
and yet may promote real freedom. Property owners, like other
individuals, are members of a community and must subordinate
their ambition to the larger whole of which they are a part. They
may find their compensation in spiritually identifying their good
with that of the larger life.
4. The Economic Theory
The economic justification of private property is that by means of
it a mwdimum of productivity is promoted. The classical economic
argument may be put thus: The successful business man, the one
who makes the greatest profit, is the one who has the greatest power
to foresee effective demand. If he has not that power his enterprise
fails. He is therefore, in fact, the best director of economic activities.
There can be little doubt that if we take the whole history of
agriculture and industry, or compare the economic output in countries
like Russia with that in the United States, there is a strong prima
facie case for the contention that more intensive cultivation of the
soil and greater productiveness of industry prevail under individual
ownership. Many a priori psychologic and economic reasons can
also be brought to explain why this must be so, why the individual
cultivator will take greater care not to exhaust the soil, etc. All this,
however, is so familiar that we may take it for granted and look at
the other side of the case, at the considerations which show that there
is a difference between socially desirable productivity and the desire
for individual profits.
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In the first place let us note that of many things the supply is not
increased by making them private property. This is obviously
true of land in cities and of other monopoly or limited goods. Private
ownership of land does not increase the amount of rainfall, and
irrigation works to make the land more fruitful have been carried
through by government more than by private initiative. Nor was
the productivity of French or Irish lands reduced when the property
of their landlords in rent charges and other incidents of seigniorage
was reduced or even abolished. In our own days, we frequently see
tobacco, cotton or wheat farmers in distress because they have
succeeded in raising too plentiful crops; and manufacturers who are
well-informed know when greater profit is to be made by a decreased
output. Patents for processes which would cheapen the product are
often bought up by manufacturers and never used. Durable goods
which are more econ6mic to the consumer are very frequently
crowded out of the market by shoddier goods which are more profitable to produce because of the larger turnover. Advertising campaigns often persuade people to buy the less economical goods and
to pay the cost of the uneconomic advice.
In the second place, there are inherent sources of waste in a regime
of private enterprise and free competition. If the biologic analogy
of the struggle for existence were taken seriously, we should see that
the natural survival of the economically fittest is attended, as in the
biologic field, with frightful wastefulness. The elimination of the
unsuccessful competitor may be a gain to the survivor but all business
failures are losses to the community.
Finally, a regime of private ownership in industry is too apt to
sacrifice social interests to immediate monetary profits. This shows
itself in speeding up industry to such a pitch that men are exhausted
in a relatively few years whereas a slower expenditure of their energy
would prolong their useful years. It shows itself in the way in which
private ownerslip enterprise has wasted a good deal of the natural
resources of the United States to obtain immediate profits. Even
when the directors of a modem industrial enterprise see the uneconnomic consequences of immediate profits, the demand of shareholders
of immediate dividends,7 and the ease with which men can desert a
business and leave it to others to stand the coming losses, all tend
to encourage ultimately wasteful and uneconomic activity. Possibly
Thus the leading brewers doubtless foresaw the coming of prohibition and
could have saved millions in losses by separating their interests from that.of the
saloon. But the large temporary loss involved in such an operation was something
that stockholders could never have agreed to.
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the best illustration of this is child labor, which by lowering wages increases immediate profits, but in the end is really wasteful of the most
precious wealth of the country, its future manhood and womanhood.
Surveying our arguments thus far: We have seen the roots of
property in custom and in the need for economic productivity, in
individual needs of privacy and in the need for social utility. But
we have also noted that property, being only one among other human
interests, cannot be pursued absolutely without detriment to human
life. Hence we can no longer maintain Montesquieu's view that
private property is sacrosanct and that the general government
must in no way interfere with or retrench its domain. The issue
before thoughtful people is therefore not the maintenance or abolition
of private property, but the determination of the precise lines along
which private enterprise must be given free scope and where it must
be restricted in the interests of the common good.
III
LIMITATIONS

OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

The traditional theory of rights, and the one that still prevails
in this country, was molded by the struggle in the 17th and i8th
centuries against restrictions on individual enterprise. These
restrictions in the interest of special privilege were fortified by the
divine (and therefore absolute) rights of kings. As is natural in all
revolts, absolute claims on one side were met with absolute denials
on the other. Hence the theory of the natural rights of the individual
took not only an absolute but a negative form; men have inalienable
rights, the state must never interfere with private property, etc.
The state, however, must interfere in order that individual rights
should become effective and not degenerate into public nuisances.
To permit anyone to do absolutely what he likes with his property
in creating noise, smells, or danger of fire, would be to make property
in general valueless. To be really effective, therefore, the right of
property must be supported by restrictions or positive duties on
the part of owners, enforced by the state as much as the right to
exclude others which is the essence of property. Unfortunately,
however, whether because of the general decline of juristic philosophy
after Hegel or because law has become more interested in defending
property against attacks by socialists, the doctrine of natural rights
has remained in the negative state and has never developed into a
doctrine of the positive contents of rights.8
8

Thus our courts are reluctant to admit that rules against unfair competition
may be in the interest of the general public and not merely for tho~e whose
immediate property interests are directly affected. Levy v. Walker, io Oh. D.
436 (1878); American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 Fed. 281, 285
(C.C.A. 6th, igoo); Dickenson v. N.R.CO., 76 W.Va. 148, 15, 85 S. E. 71(1915).
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Lawyers occupied with civil or private law have in any case continued the absolutistic conception of property; and in doing this,
they are faithful to the language of the great i8th century codes, the
French, Prussian, and Austrian, and even of 19 th century codes like
the Italian and German which also begin with a definition of property
as absolute or unlimited though they subsequently introduce qualifying or limiting provisions. 9
As, however, no individual rights can in fact be exercised in a
community, except under public restriction, it has been left mainly
to publicists,' 0 to writers on politics and constitutional and administrative law to consider the limitations of private property necessary
for public safety, peace, health, and morals, as well as in the interest
of all those enterprises like housing, education, the preservation of
natural resources, etc. which the community finds it necessary to
entrust to the state rather than to private hands. The fact, however,
that in the United States the last word on law comes from judges,
who, like other lawyers, are for the most part, trained in private
rather than in public law, is one of the reasons why with us traditional
conceptions of property prevail over obvious national interests such
as the freedom of laborers to organize, the necessity of preserving
certain standards of living, of preventing the future manhood and
womanhood of the .country from being sacrificed to individual
profits, and the like. Our students of property law need, therefore,
to be reminded that not only has the whole law since the industrial
revolution shown a steady growth in ever new restrictions under
use of private property, but that the ideal of absolute laissez faire
has never in fact been completely operative.
(i) Living in a free land economy we have lost the sense of how
exceptional in the history of mankind is the absolutely free power of
directing what shall be done with our property after our death.
In the history of the common law, wills as to land begin only in the
reign of Henry VIII. On the continent it is still restrained by the
system of the reserve. In England no formal restriction has been
necessary because of the system of entails or strict settlement.
Even in the United States, we have kept such rules as that against
perpetuities which is certainly a restraint on absolute freedom of
testamentary disposition.
French Civil Code, § 544; Prussian Landrecht 1, 8, § i; Austrian General Civil
Code, 354; German Civil Code, § 903; Italian Civil Code, § 436. Cf. Markby
El. of Law, § 3zo; Aubry & Rann, § 19o.
IaThe great Jhering is an honorable exception. The distinction between
property for use and property for power was developed by the Austrian jurist,
A. Menger, and made current by the German economist, Ad. Wagner.
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Even as to the general power of alienating the land inter vivos
history shows that some restrictions are always present. The
persistence of dower rights in our own individualistic economy is a
case in point. Land and family interest have been too closely connected to sacrifice the former completely to pure individualism.
Though the interests of free exchange of goods and services have
never been as powerful as in the last century, governments have
not abandoned the right to regulate the rate of interest to be charged
for the use of money, or to fix the price of certain other services of
general public importance, e. g. railway rates, grain-elevators and
warehouse charges, etc. The excuse that this applies only to business
affected with a public interest, is a very thin one. What large
business is therein which the public has not a real interest? Is coal
less a public affair than gas, or electricity? Courts and conservative
lawyers sometimes speak as if the regulation of wages by the state
were a wild innovation which would upset all economic order as well
as our legal tradition. Yet the direct regulation of wages has been
a normal activity of English law; and we in fact regulate it indirectly
by limiting hours of work, prohibiting payment in truck, enforcing
certain periodic payments, etc.; and under the compensation acts
the law compels an employer to pay his laborer when the latter
cannot work at all on account of some accident.
(2)
More important than the foregoing are limitations of the use
of property. Looking at the matter realistically fewwill question the
wisdom of Holdsworth's remarks, that "at no time can the state
be wholly indifferent to the use which the owners make of their
property."" There must be restrictions on the use of property not
only in the interests of other property owners but also in the interests
of the health, safety, religion, morals, and general welfare of the
whole community. No community can view with indifference the
exploitation of the needy by commercial greed. As under the conditions of crowded life, the reckless or unconscionable use of one's
property is becoming more and more dangerous, enlightened jurists
find new doctrines to limit the abuse of ancient rights. The French
doctrine of abus de droit, the prohibition of Chicanery in the German
Civil Code, and the rather vague use of malice in the common law
are all efforts in that direction. 2
(3) Of greatest significance is the fact that in all civilized legal
systems there is a great deal of just expropriation or confiscation
nHOLDSWORTH, 8 HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1926), C. 4.

2RoussEL, L'ABUS Du DROIT.
HARV. L. REv 5o.

German Civil Code, § 226; Walton in 22
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without any direct compensation. This may sound shocking to
those who think that for the state to take away the property of the
citizen is not only theft or robbery but even worse, an act of treachery,
since the state avowedly exists to protect people in those very rights.
As a believer in natural rights, I believe that the state can, and
unfortunately often does, enact unjust laws. But I think it is a sheer
fallacy based on verbal illusion to think that the rights of the community against an individual owner are no better than the rights
of a neighbor. Indeed, no one has in fact had the courage of this
confusion to argue that the state has no right to deprive an individual
of property to which he is so attached that he refuses any money
for it. Though no neighbor has such a right the public interest often
justly demands that a proprietor shall part with his ancestral home
to which he may be attached by all the roots of his being.
When taking away a man's property, is the state always bound
to pay a direct compensation? I submit that while this is generally
advisable in order not to disturb the general feeling of security, no
absolute principle of justice requires it. I have alluded before to the
fact that there is no injustice in taxing an old bachelor to educate
the children of others, or to tax one immune to typhoid for the
construction of sewers or other sanitary measures. We may go
farther and say that the whole business of the state depends upon
its rightful power to take away the property of some (in the form of
taxation) and use it to support others, such as the needy, those
invalided in the service of the state in war or peace, and those who
are not yet able to produce but in whom the hope of humanity is
embodied. D6ubtless, taxation and confiscation may be actuated
by malice and may impose needless and cruel hardship on some
individuals or classes. But this is not to deny that taxation and
confiscation are within the just powers of the state. A number of
examples may make this clearer.
(a) Slavery. When slavery is abolished by law; the owners
have their property taken away. Is the state ethically bound to
pay them the full market value of their slaves? It is doubtless a
grievous shock to a community to have a large number of slave owners
whose wealth often makes them leaders of culture, suddenly deprived
of their income. It may also be conceded that it is not always
desirable for the slave himself to be suddenly taken away from his
master and cut adrift on the sea of freedom. But when one reads
of the horrible ways in which some of those slaves were violently
torn from their homes in Africa and shamelessly deprived of their
human rights, one is inclined to agree with Emerson that compensa-
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tion should first be paid to the slaves. This compensation need not
be in the form of a direct bounty to them. It may be more effectively
paid in the form of rehabilitation and education for freedom; and
such a charge may take precedence over the claims of the former
owners. After all, the latter claims are no greater than those of a
protected industry when the tariff is removed. If the state should
decide that certain import duties, e. g. those on scientific instruments,
or hospital supplies, are unjustified and proceed to abolish them,
many manufacturers may suffer. Are they entitled to compensation
by the state?
It is undoubtedly for the general good to obviate as much as
possible the effect of economic shock to a large number of people.
The routine of life prospers on security. But when that security
contains a large element of injustice the shock of an economic operation by law may be necessary and ethically justified.
This will enable us to deal with other types of confiscation.
(b) Financial loss through the abolition of public office. It is only
in very recent times that we have got into the habit of ignoring the
fact that public office is and always has been regarded as a source of
revenue like any other occupation. When, therefore, certain public
offices are abolished for the sake of good government, a number of
people are deprived of their expected income. In the older law and
often in popular judgment of today this does not seem fair. But
reflection shows that the state is not obligated to pay anyone when
it finds that particular services of his are unnecessary. At best, it
should help him to find a new occupation.
Part of the prerogative of the English or Scotch landlord was the
right to nominate the priest for the parish on his land. To abolish
this right of advowson is undoubtedly a confiscation of a definite
property right. But while I cannot agree with my friend Mr. Laski "
that the courts were wrong to refuse to disobey the law which subordinated the religious scruples of a church to the property rights of
an individual, I do not see that there could have been any sound
ethical objection to the legislature changing the law without compensating the landlord.
(c) In our own day, we have seen the confiscation of many millions
of dollars of property through prohibition. Were the distillers and
brewers entitled to compensation for their losses? We have seen
that property on a large scale is power and the loss of it, while evil
to those who are accustomed to exercise it, may not be an evil to the
community. In point of fact, the shock to the distillers and brewers
13
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was not as serious as to others, e. g. saloon keepers and bartenders
who did not lose any legal property since they were only employees,
but who found it difficult late in life to enter new employments.
History is full of examples of valuable property privileges abolished
without any compensation, e. g. the immunity of nobles from taxation,
their rights to hunt over other people's lands, etc. It would be
absurd to claim that such legislation was unjust.
These and other examples of justifiable confiscation without
compensation are inconsistent with the absolute theory of private
property. An adequate theory of private property, however, should
enable us to draw the line between justifiable and unjustifiable cases
of confiscation. Such a theory I cannot undertake to elaborate on
this occasion, though the doctrine of security of possession and
avoidance of unnecessary shock seem to me suggestive. I wish
however to urge that if the large property owner is viewed, as he
ought to be, as a wielder of power over the lives of his fellow citizens,
the law should not hesitate to develop a doctrine as to his positive
duties in the public interest. The owner of a tenement house in a
modem city is in fact a public official and has all sorts of positive
duties. He must keep the halls lighted, he must see that the roof
does not leak, that there are fire-escape facilities, he must remove
tenants guilty of certain public immoralities, etc., and he is compensated by the fees of his tenants which the law is beginning to
regulate. Similar is the case of a factory owner. He must install all
sorts of safety appliances, hygienic conveniences, see that the workmen are provided with a certain amount of light, air, etc. In general, there is no reason for the law insisting that people
should make the most economic use of their property. They have
a motive in doing so themselves and the cost of the enforcing machinery may be a mischievous waste. Yet there may be times, such as
occurred during the late war, when the state may insist that man
shall cultivate the soil intensively and be otherwise engaged in
socially productive work.
With considerations such as these in mind, it becomes clear.that
there is no unjustifiable taking away of property when railroads are
prohibited from posting notice that they will discharge their employees
if the latter join trade unions, and that there is no property taken
away without due or just process of law when an industry is compelled
to pay its laborers a minimum of subsistence instead of having it
done by private or public charity or else systematically starving its
workers.
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IV
POLITICAL VS. ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY

If the discussion of property by those interested in private law has
suffered from a lack of realism and from too great a reliance on vague
a priori plausibilities, much the same can be said about political
discussion as to the proper limits of state action in regard to property
and economic enterprise. Utterly unreal is all talk of men being
robbed of their power of initiative because the state undertakes some
service, e. g. to build a bridge across a river. Men are not deprived
of opportunities for real self reliance by having their streets lighted
at night, by filling up holes in the pavements, by removing other
dangers to life and limb and by providing opportunities for education
to all. The conditions of modem life are complex and distracting
enough so that if we can ease the strain by simplifying some things
through state action we are all the gainers by it. Certain things
have to be done in a community and the question whether they
should be left to private enterprise dominated by the profit motive
or to the government dominated by political considerations, is not
a question of man versus the state, but simply a question of which
organization and motive can best do the work. Both private and
government enterprise are initiated and carried through by individual
human beings. A realistic attitude would not begin with the assumption that all men in the government service are less or more intelligent
or efficient than all those in private business. It would rather inquire
what sort of people are drawn into government service and what
attitudes their organization develops in contrast with that of private
business. This is a matter for specific factual inquiry, unfortunately
most sadly neglected. In the absence of such definite knowledge I
can only venture a few guesses.
Government officials seem likely to be chosen more for their
oratorical ability, popularly likeable manners, and political availability, and less for their competence and knowledge of the problems
with which they have to deal. The inheritance of wealth, however,
may bring incompetent people for a while into control of private
business. More serious is the fact that political officials have less
incentive to initiate new ventures. Political leaders in touch with
public sentiment are apt to be too conservative and prefer to avoid
trouble by letting things alone. Their bureaucratic underlings, on
whom they are more dependent than business executives on theirs,
are apt to overemphasize the value of red tape, i. e. to care more for
uniformity of governmental procedure than for the diverse special
needs to which they ought to minister. All business administration,
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however, also loses in efficiency as its volume increases. On the
other hand, experience has shown all civilized peoples the indispensable need for communal control to prevent the abuse of private
enterprise. Only a political or general government is competent
to deal with a problem like city congestion, because only the general
government can coordinate a number of activities some of which
have no financial motive. Private business may be more efficient
in saving money. It does so largely by paying smaller wages to the
many and higher remuneration to those on top. From a social
point of view this is not necessarily a good in itself. It is well to note
that men of great ability and devotion frequently prefer to work for
the government at a lower pay than they can obtain in private
employment. There is something more than money in daily employment. Humanity prefers-not altogether, unwisely -to follow the
lead of those who are sensitive rather than those who are efficient.
Business efficiency mars the beauty of our countryside with hideous
advertising signs and would, if allowed, ruin the scenic grandeur of
Niagara.
The subordination of everything to the single aim of monetary
profit leads industrial government to take the form of absolute
monarchy. Monarchy has a certain simplicity and convenience;
but in the long run it is seldom the best for all concerned. Sooner
or later it leads to insurrections. It is short-sighted to assume that
an employer cannot possibly run his business without the absolute
right to hire and fire his employees whenever he feels like. It is
interesting to note that even a modern army is run without giving
the general the absolute right to hire and fire. In this connection,
I recall a conversation between a British Ambassador, Sir John
Malcolm, and the Shah of Persia. The latter was surprised when he
learned that the king of England could not at his pleasure behead
any of his courtiers. How can one be king under such conditions?
However, when he learned that the king of England did not have
to fear so much for his own life the Shah began to see some advantage
in limiting the absolute power of the monarch. May not democratic
or limited constitutional government in industry have some human
advantages over unlimited monarchy?14
The main difficulty, however, with industrial and financial government is that the governors are released from all responsibility for
the actual human effects of their policies. Formerly, the employer
14It used to be thought that there could be no credit transactions if the creditor
could not acquire dominion over the body of the debtor in default. Yet credit
is no less secure since the abolition of imprisonment for debt.
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could observe and had an interest in the health and morals of his
apprentice. Now, the owners or stockholders have lost all personal
touch with all but few of those who work for them. The human
element is thus completely subordinated to the profit motive. In
some cases this even makes for industrial inefficiency as when railroads
or other businesses are run by financiers in the interest of stock
manipulation. Very often our captains of finance exercise power by
controlling other people's funds. This was strikingly shown when
several millions of dollars were paid for some shares of little inherent
value but which enabled the purchaser to control the assets of a great
life insurance company. Professor Ripley has recently thrown Wall
Street into a turmoil by pointing out the extent to which promoters
and financiers may with little investments of their own control great
industrial undertakings.
Let me conclude. There can be no doubt that our property laws
do confer sovereign power on our captains of industry and even more
so on our captains of finance.
Now it would be unworthy of a philosopher to shy at government
by captains of industry and finance. Humanity has been ruled by
priests, soldiers, hereditary landlords, and even antiquarian scholars.
The results are not such as to make us view with alarm a new type
of ruler. But if we are entering a new era involving a new set of
rulers, it is well to recognize it and reflect on what is involved.
For the first time in the history of mankind the producer of things
is in the saddle, not of course the actual physical producer, but
the master mind that directs the currents of production. If this
is contrary to the tradition of philosophy from Plato down, we may
well be told that our philosophy needs revision. Great captains of
industry and finance like the late James J. Hill deal with problems
in many respects bigger than those that faced Caesar and Augustus
in building the Roman Empire.
Still the fear may well be expressed that as modern life is becoming
more and more complex it is dangerous to give too much sovereignty
to those who are after all dealing with the rather simpler aspects of
life involved in economic relations.
It may, of course, rightly be contended that the modern captain
of industry is not merely concerned with the creation of things, that
his success is largely determined by his judgment and ability to
manage large numbers of human beings that form part of his organization. Against this, however, there is the obvious retort that the
only ability taken account of in the industrial and financial world,
the ability to make money, is a very specialized one; and when
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business men get into public office they are notably successful.
Too often they forget that while saving the money of the taxpayer
may be an admirable incident, it is not the sole or even the principal
end of communal life and government. The wise expenditure of
money is a more complicated problem than the mere saving it, and
a no less indispensable task to those who face the question of how
to promote a better communal life. To do this effectively we need
a certain liberal insight into the more intangible desires of the human
heart. Preoccupation with the management of property has not
in fact advanced this kind of insight.
Many things are produced to the great detriment of the health
and morals of the consumers as well as the producers. This refers
not only to things that are inherently deleterious or enervating to
those who create them and those who use them. It includes also
many of the things of which people buy more than they need and
more than is consistent with peace and leisure of mind which is the
essence of culture.
It is certainly a shallow philosophy which would make human
welfare synonomous with the indiscriminate production and consumption of material goods. If there is one iota of wisdom in all
the religions or philosophies which have supported the human race in
the past it is that man cannot live by economic goods alone but
needs vision and wisdom to determine what things are worth while
and what things it would be better to do without. This profound
human need of controlling and moderating our coisumptive demands
cannot be left to those whose dominant interest is to stimulate such
demands.
It is characteristic of the low state of our philosophy that the
merits of capitalism have been argued by both individualists and
socialists exclusively from the point of view of the production and
distribution of goods. To the profounder question as to what goods
are ultimately worthwhile producing from the point of view of the
social effects on the producers and consumers almost no attention
is paid. Yet surely this is a matter which requires the guidance of
collective wisdom, not to be left to chance or anarchy.

